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Critical realism, especially as developed by Bhaskar, embodies at its heart systemic and holistic 
concepts such as totality, emergence, open systems, stratification, autopoiesis and holistic causality. 
These concepts have their own long history of development in disciplines such as systems thinking 
and cybernetics but, there is an absence in Bhaskar’s writings, and that absence is a lack of any 
reference to the corresponding systems literature. The purpose of this paper is threefold: i) to 
demonstrate the extent of this correspondence; ii) to show that critical realism can benefit from an 
exposure to these other discourses; and iii) to show that systems thinking too can gain philosophically 
from critical realism. 
 
Key words: autopoiesis, complexity theory, critical realism, cybernetics, emergence, holism, social 
systems theory, systems thinking  
 
1. Introduction 
Critical realism (CR) clearly embodies systemic and holistic themes at its very heart with 
concepts such as totality, holistic causality, emergence, open systems, autopoiesis, and levels 
of stratification. These concepts have their own history of development within the discipline 
known systems theory or systems thinking but there is almost no reference to this literature 
within Bhaskar’s (or other critical realists’) writings. I do not know whether this reflects a 
lack of familiarity with the literature or a desire to establish a new and autonomous discourse 
which is not seen as a part of something else. In any case, the links are in fact very clear and 
it is the purpose of this paper to draw them out.  
 
I believe this is important to do for several reasons: first, it should be done for purely 
scholarly reasons. Systems thinking has a long history and its implicit contribution to critical 
realism should be made clear. Second, and more importantly, CR can gain from such an 
interchange. There has been much debate and clarification about these concepts within the 
systems literature which can aid their employment within CR, and there are further concepts 
and perspectives which CR could usefully employ. Third, systems thinking can, in its turn, 
gain from CR. Philosophically, it is still based on a schism between positivism and 
interpretivism which CR does much to dissolve.  
 
The logic of the paper is that the first section will present a brief history of the development 
of systems thinking since the 1920’s, not for its own sake but in order to explore the various 
theories, concepts and debates that are relevant to CR. The next two sections then discuss the 
use of systems concepts in Bhaskar’s early (pre Dialectics) and later work. 
2. The Development of Systems Thinking 
Systems thinking or the systems approach1 developed in its modern form with a burst of new 
ideas in a range of disciplines during the 1920s and 1930s although some of the underlying 
                                                 
1 I shall use these terms interchangeably. The meaning of other related terms such as cybernetics, general 
systems theory (GST) or holism will be brought out in the text. 
 3 
 
principles can be traced back to the Greeks, especially Aristotle2. Traditional disciplines that 
were involved include biology, psychology and even quantum physics, while new disciplines 
emerged, based on systemic ideas, such as ecology and cybernetics. 
There was a major epistemological break within systems thinking during the 1970s in which 
a new stream of thought based on constructivism or phenomenology was initiated. This 
mirrored similar developments within the other social sciences which is obviously very much 
the concern of critical realism. This development is generally known as soft as opposed to 
hard systems thinking or sometimes second-order rather than first-order cybernetics. 
2.1 Phase 1, hard systems thinking 
 
The most fundamental idea of systems thinking is the anti-reductionist one that we cannot 
explain the behaviour of objects and entities purely in terms of the nature and constitution of 
their parts or components. Rather, the parts are related together in such a way that the whole 
has behaviours or, more generally, properties that are distinct from, and irreducible to, the 
properties of the parts. This is often expressed in the phrase, possibly due to Aristotle, that the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts. This is easily shown by examples: water has very 
different properties from its constituents oxygen and hydrogen; a plane can fly, its parts 
cannot; stereograms and Magic Eye pictures can generate 3-D images in a human brain; and a 
football crowd can produce a ‘Mexican wave’.  
 
This may seem obvious now, but in the early part of the 20th century it was totally against the 
prevailing worldview. Science had been incredibly successful over several hundred years 
based on the Cartesian reductionist view that the way to proceed was to successively split up 
entities into their component parts until ultimate components were reached, at which point 
ultimate explanations were possible. However, at this time Kuhnian-type problems were 
being experienced in all the major disciplines, even physics itself, and this led to the 
recognition of the importance of wholes over parts, or equally form over substance.  
 
In biology, great progress had been made in understanding the parts of organisms, down to 
the level of their biochemistry, but this could not explain the complex behaviour of cells as a 
whole, nor could it explain how cells differentiated during the development of an organism. 
Two alternatives to reductionism emerged – vitalism and organicism. Vitalism3 asserted that 
there must be some unknown or unobservable element or force that was possessed by living 
things, whilst organicism4  held that the explanation was simply the organisation of the 
relationships and interaction of all the parts together. Early organicists actually used the term 
‘system’ and it was perhaps best articulated in Woodger’s Biological Principles.5 
  
Similar ideas were being developed in other disciplines. In psychology, the Gestalt school 
argued that perceptions and thoughts always occurred as wholes in themselves, which could 
not be broken up into parts.6 This is often illustrated by perceptual illusions such as the 
young/old lady where we see one thing or the other but never both. Ecology was also picking 
up on ideas of relationships and wholeness from the organicist biologists. Haeckel7 created 
                                                 
2 Good sources for overviews of the history of systems are Capra, 1997, Checkland, 1981, Hayles, 1999, Heims, 
1993. and there is an interesting and very detailed timeline at the American Society for Cybernetics, 2006. 
3 Driesch, 1908.   
4 Ritter, 1919. 
5 Woodger, 1929. 
6 Wertheimer and King 2005. 
7 Haeckel, 1866. 
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the term as ‘the science of relations between the organism and the surrounding outer world’, 
and von Uexküll8 named the outer world Umwelt or ‘environment’ – another key systems 
concept.  
 
Finally we can mention that atomic physics itself, the bastion of reductionism, also 
recognised wholeness at the very fundamental levels of subatomic particles which were not 
so much discrete particles but webs of interacting forces. As Heisenberg9  put it: ‘ ..in modern 
physics the world is not divided into different groups of objects but rather into different 
groups of relationships … The world thus appears as a complicated tissue of events, in which 
connections of different kinds alternate or overlap or combine and thereby determine the 
texture of the whole.’   
 
A second important realisation came out of quantum physics, again in opposition to the 
prevailing positivist view of science, which was the inevitable involvement of the observer in 
any observations or descriptions that we make of the world. Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle showed that the results we might get could not be simply reflections of the external 
world alone but were always in part due to the very act of observation. Again, as 
Heisenberg10 put it, ‘Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature … it 
describes nature as exposed to our method of questioning’. As we shall see, it is very 
much one of the important planks of systems thinking that the observer must be recognised as 
part of the system. 
 
The central systemic idea – that the characteristics and behaviour of entities depended on the 
structure of relationships between components rather than the properties of the components 
themselves – carries with it several other concepts – emergence, hierarchy (or stratification as 
Bhaskar tends to call it) and boundaries.  
 
Emergence is certainly a key feature of Bhaskar’s critical realism which he has at times 
described as ‘synchronic emergent powers materialism’. Although the subject of much 
debate,11 the basic idea of emergent powers or properties is clear. The emergent properties of 
an entity are properties possessed only by the entity as a whole, not by any of its components 
or the simple aggregation of the components (as for example in mass). Emergent properties 
result from the components and the particular structure of relationships between the 
components which constitute the entity. The examples presented above are all illustrations of 
emergent properties. 
 
With emergence comes hierarchy. If we consider a system at a particular level it consists of 
components and relations. However, each component can itself be treated as a system and 
‘opened up’ to reveal another set of components and relations. This process can in principle 
go on for an indefinite number of levels until we reach the bedrock of indissoluble forces. We 
can also go in the other direction from the initial system and see that it is only a component of 
a further hierarchy of wider systems. In fact the term hierarchy can be misleading – it is better 
described as a nesting of systems within systems much like Russian dolls. At each level 
systems, with their emergent properties, interact with each other governed by their structure 
of relationships generating a new level of system with its own emergent properties. 
 
                                                 
8 von Uexkull, 1909. 
9 Heisenberg, 1963. 107. 
10 Heisenberg, 1963, p. 75. 
11 Elder-Vass, 2005. 
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The third concept is that of boundary. If emergent properties are attributed to a particular 
entity in virtue of its components and relations we must be able we must be able to demarcate 
the system that has the properties from its environment. This may seem relatively clear when 
we are dealing with physically discrete objects that have a single clear boundary, but 
becomes much more contentious when dealing with complex systems that may be physically 
diffuse; that may consist of different types of components some of which may not actually be 
physical (e.g., information or ideas); and above all when we deal with social systems.12 
 
The concepts covered so far may be considered structural in that they deal with the structure 
of systems as opposed to their processes. The distinction between these is time-relative but 
essentially the structure of a system is the components and relations between components that 
remain (relatively) constant over time. Process or dynamics is that which changes. The main 
researcher in this area, who is often seen as the founder of the systems movement, is Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy13  (published in German in the 1940s)] with the concept of open systems and 
of general systems theory (GST).14 Till that point science had generally concerned itself with 
systems that were closed to their environment. Within such systems the 2nd law of 
thermodynamics held and this suggested that entropy would always increase and the systems, 
including the whole universe, would eventually run down. However, this was clearly not the 
case with individual organisms or with evolution as a whole, both of which appeared to be 
anti-entropic. To resolve this dilemma, Bertalanffy proposed the concept of an open system 
which was in a state of dynamic (rather than static) equilibrium based on continual import 
from and export to the environment. Metabolism in the cell was one of the classic examples 
of this and the self-regulation of these processes was one of the key emergent properties.15 
Another concept developed at this time, based on principles of feedback, was that of 
homeostasis.16 
 
Bertalanffy’s second contribution was to try to establish a new, over-arching discipline 
known as general systems theory. This was based on the recognition that the systems 
concepts and principles we have described can be applied irrespective of the particular nature 
or substance of the systems concerned. It is therefore possible to study systems relationships 
and organisations in the abstract and then apply them, as with mathematics, to particular 
domains.  
 
The next, and very significant, development happened during and after WWII with the 
development of an entirely new discipline – cybernetics – the science of communication and 
control17. The early cyberneticians, Weiner18, von Neumann, Shannon19 and McCulloch were 
mainly mathematicians and engineers who were interested in the ways in which systems, both 
mechanical and biological, regulated and controlled themselves in a largely automatic way. 
They recognised that the key to this was the concepts of information and feedback. Working 
initially on the design of self-controlling weapons the ideas soon spread into modelling the 
                                                 
12 Mingers, 2006, Ch. 4. 
13 von Bertalanffy, 1950, 1971. 
14 Although many of the ideas were foreshadowed by the Russian, Bogdanov 1980 (originally 1922). in his work 
on tektology  which was not widely known at the time. 
15 These ideas formed the basis for Prigogene’s 1984. work in the 1970s on dissipative structures for which he 
gained the Nobel prize. 
16 Cannon, 1939. 
17 The term kybernetike was used by Plato and Aristotle to mean the art of steering or governorship. 
18 Weiner, 1948. 
19 Shannon and Weaver, 1949. 
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functioning of the brain,20 developing the first digital computers,21 anthropology22 and 
psychiatry.23  
 
The most fundamental idea of cybernetics is that of circular (as opposed to linear) causality, 
more commonly known as feedback. This is a most ubiquitous phenomena in which a chain 
of causal connections is such that a change in one element eventually feeds back to either 
balance or reinforce the initial change. This had been known about practically for centuries. 
The Greek, Philon, designed an oil lamp which maintained its level of oil constant through a 
float, and Watt’s steam engine governor was one of the most important inventions of the 
industrial revolution. The Watt’s governor involved two heavy metal balls connected to the 
output axle of the steam engine. When the axle speeds up the balls move outward under 
centrifugal force; they are connected to the steam control so that the outward movement 
reduces the amount of steam which in turn reduces the speed of the axle. If the speed reduces, 
the balls move inwards with the opposite effect. This is a classic example of negative or 
balancing feedback which automatically maintains some variable at a constant level. Much of 
the regularity and constancy of the natural world is maintained by complex feedback loops 
such as this.  
 
The opposite type of feedback also exists: positive or reinforcing feedback. Consider 
compound interest, a sum of money generates interest which is added to the money so that 
even more interest is produced in the next period. While negative feedback produces order 
and stability, positive feedback produces exponential growth or decay. The early 
cyberneticians were mainly interested in the way that negative feedback could produce 
apparently purposive or teleological behaviour without any form of conscious mental 
control,24 although later Maruyama25 focussed attention on positive feedback processes, in 
what he called ‘second cybernetics’26. 
 
Systems concepts were also applied extensively in sociology, for example Parsons27  whose 
work was criticised for being overly functionalist; Buckley28 who emphasised the dynamic 
and processual aspects of systems; Luhmann29 who produced a radical reworking of Parsons 
based on autopoiesis; and Habermas30 whose work formed the basis for critical systems 
thinking. 
 
The final development I will consider in the first phase of systems thinking is what became 
known as system dynamics. Jay Forrester, at MIT, was initially interested in applying the 
ideas of positive and negative feedback to investigating population dynamics – especially 
patterns of urban development.31 He also applied the ideas to industrial supply networks32 and 
perhaps the most famous analysis was the Club of Rome’s report on the future of the world 
                                                 
20 McCullough and Pitts, 1943. 
21 von Neumann, 1958. 
22 Bateson, 1936. 
23 Bateson, 1973. 
24 Rosenblueth, et al., 1943. 
25 Maruyama, 1963. 
26 Which is distinct from “second-order cybernetics” to be discussed later. 
27 Parsons, 1951. 
28 Buckley, 1967. 
29 Luhmann, 1995. 
30 Habermas, 1987. 
31 Forrester, 1969.. 
32 Forrester, 1961. 
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economy called ‘Limits to Growth’33 which was one of the first to point out the effects of the 
world using up its natural resources.  
 
However, from a critical realist perspective it is the later work of Sterman34  and Senge35 
which is most relevant. They drew the distinction between the overt behaviour of the system 
of interest and the underlying, and often unobservable, pattern of causal relations that 
generated the behaviour. Their motto was that ‘behaviour follows structure’: put different 
people within the same structure and it is likely that the same behaviour will emerge. This is 
very similar to Bhaskar’s distinction between the domain of actual events, and the domain of 
the real enduring mechanisms which generate them.36 Senge also developed the concept of 
‘systems archetypes’, that is, particular patterns of feedback loops that occur very often in the 
real-world and generate particular patterns of behaviour. 
2.2 Phase 2, soft systems thinking 
The work so far described was carried out within the prevailing positivist paradigm but, as in 
other disciplines, this was extensively critiqued during the 1970s and a new paradigm known 
as soft systems or second-order cybernetics emerged. Within cybernetics there had always 
been a recognition that observation was not wholly objective, but was to some extent 
dependent on the act of observation, or the observer. Heinz von Foerster and others at the 
Biological Computer Laboratory saw that in using cybernetic ideas to study the mind and the 
brain they were in fact also studying the process of observation itself.37 This self-
referentiality was referred to as the ‘cybernetics of cybernetics’.38  
 
The ideas were developed most coherently in the work of the biologists Maturana and Varela 
Maturana and Varela, 1980, Maturana and Varela, 1987, Mingers, 1995. who coined the term 
autopoiesis to described the circular, self-producing, organisation of living systems, a term 
that has been explicitly used by Bhaskar Mingers, 2004.. Maturana wanted to answer the 
most basic question: what distinguishes living systems from non-living systems? What is 
their essential property? He saw that you could not characterise a living system, for example 
an amoeba, in terms of purpose for it has no purpose except its continued existence, but you 
could in terms of what it does, what it produces. A living cell is a complex network of 
processes of chemical production that produces the very components which constitute the 
network in the first place. It produces itself. Non-living systems, which he termed allopoietic, 
produce something other than themselves, for instance, a chemical reaction converts some 
inputs into a different output. Autopoietic systems are organisationally closed but 
interactively open. 
 
Maturana was also a neurophysiologist and had conducted empirical work on the perceptual 
systems of animals such as pigeons and frogs.39 This work showed that there was not a one-
to-one correspondence between the visual environment and the resultant neuronal activity. 
Perception could not be an internal picturing of the external world but was, rather, the result 
of internal patterns of correlation and association. Sensory stimuli did not determine but only 
triggered or selected subsequent states of nervous activity. The nervous system, too, is 
                                                 
33 Meadows, et al., 1972. 
34 Sterman, 2000. 
35 Senge, 1990. 
36 Mingers, 2000b. 
37 Lettvin, et al., 1959, Von Foerster, 1984. 
38 Von Foerster, 1975. 
39 Maturana, 1968, Maturana, 1960. 
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organisationally closed – it is not open to the environment, our experiences are internally 
constructed although modulated through our interactions with the external world. This led to 
a strongly constructivist view of epistemology and ontology. The world that we experience, 
whether perceptually or linguistically, is a world that we construct; we can never have 
unmediated access to an external world: 
 
Indeed, everything said is said by an observer to another observer that could be him- or 
herself. 40 
I am saying that all phenomena … are cognitive phenomena that arise in observing as the 
observer operates in language … Nothing precedes its distinction; existence in any 
domain, even the existence of the observer themselves, is constituted in the distinctions 
of the observer 41 
 
The second major source of interpretive thinking was within applied systems, specifically 
within engineering and management systems. Hard systems thinking had developed within 
engineering, for example in designing complex chemical plants. It had also developed within 
management as, for example, with Stafford Beer’s management cybernetics42 or Ackoff and 
Emery’s ‘purposeful systems’43. But a new paradigm was established with Checkland’s 
development of soft systems methodology (SSM).44 
 
On the basis of many practical projects in organisations, Checkland argued that social 
systems were intrinsically different to physical systems. One could not take the nature of a 
social system as given, from an external viewpoint, in the way that one could perhaps a 
machine or an organism. The essential difference is that the members of a social system, such 
as an organisation, would inevitable bestow their own meanings and senses on the system, 
and these had to be seen as equally valid ways of interpreting their reality. The purpose of 
SSM was, therefore, not to describe or design some objective system, but instead to articulate 
and explore the differing perceptions or Weltanschauungen held by participants within a 
problematic situation, and by doing so hopefully bring about an agreed improvement to the 
situation. 
 
{we} need to remind ourselves that we have no access to what the world is, to ontology, 
only to descriptions of the world, … that is to say, to epistemology. … Thus systems 
thinking is only an epistemology, a particular way of describing the world. It does not 
tell us what the world is. Hence, strictly speaking, we should never say of something in 
the world: ‘It is a system’, only: ‘It may be described as a system’. … The important 
feature of paradigm II {soft systems} as compared with paradigm I {hard systems} is 
that it transfers systemicity from the world to the process of enquiry into the world. 45 
 
Checkland explicitly allied SSM to phenomenology and against positivism and he has never 
accepted the possibility of an excluded middle – namely critical realism. 
                                                 
40 Maturana, 1988, p. 27. 
41 Maturana, 1988, p. 79. 
42 Beer, 1966. 
43 Ackoff and Emery, 1972. 
44 Checkland, 1972, Checkland, 1981, Checkland and Scholes, 1990, Mingers, 2000a. 
45 Checkland, 1983, p. 671. 
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2.3 Critical systems thinking 
Finally, I should mention that, like other social sciences, systems thinking has also developed 
a critical stream, drawing mainly on the work of Habermas46  which recognised the role and 
limitations of both hard and soft systems thinking, and maintained that there was also a need 
for emancipatory systems thinking. And there has even been work drawing on postmodern 
perspectives and particularly Foucault’s work.47 
Recently consideration has been given to ethics and Mingers 2009. undertook a comparison 
between Habermas’s discourse ethics Habermas, 1992. and the ethics implicit in critical 
realism. 
2.4 Non-linear dynamical systems (complexity theory) 
Complexity theory, also known as non-linear dynamical systems theory, developed during 
the 1970/80s in a range of sciences – biology, chemistry, mathematics and economics 
Kaufmann, 1995, Waldrop, 1992.. Traditionally, these hard sciences had assumed stability, 
equilibrium, linear change, cyclicality, robustness, and simple models generating simple 
behavior (and vice versa). Chaos and complexity are the results of a Kuhnian revolution that 
emphasises instability, far-from-equilibrium, sudden change, sensitivity to initial conditions 
and complex behavior from simple models (and vice versa) Mainzer, 1997, Lewin, 1992.. 
Two interesting questions are: to what extent do these insights apply to soft sciences and 
organizations Byrne, 1998, Cilliers, 2000.? And, to what extent can complexity theory be 
encompassed within traditional systems thinking? 
 
Certainly there seems to be much evidence in our globalised world that many of these effects 
are indeed real at a social and economic level. However, with regard to the second question 
we would argue that all of the complexity effects can be generated within the traditional 
systems thinking framework as resulting from particular patterns of, especially positive, 
feedback loops and networks of interactions between large numbers of relatively simple 
units. For instance, Mosekilde and Laugesen48 have shown that the Beer Game, a well-known 
feedback based management game, can display all the behaviour typical of complex systems. 
3. Systemic Concepts in Bhaskar’s Early Work 
In considering systemic motifs in Bhaskar’s work, I shall distinguish between the early 
material up to Dialectic (DPF),49 where they are relatively implicit, and Dialectic and Plato 
Etc. (P)50 where they become much more explicit but different terms are often used.  
3.1 Systems, structures, mechanisms and emergence 
 
A Realist Theory of Science (RTS)51 begins in the Introduction by outlining the fundamental 
concepts from which the initial version of critical realism (CR) is built. The world is taken 
(on the basis of transcendental arguments) to consist of structures and mechanisms (or 
‘things’, although that term has overly physicalist overtones for his later work) that have 
powers and liabilities to generate the events that actually occur. These structures are distinct 
from the events they generate. Events occur at a particular point in time, but the structures are 
                                                 
46 Midgley, 1995, Mingers, 1992a, Flood and Jackson, 1991, Jackson, 1985 , Mingers, 1980. 
47 Brocklesby and Cummings, 1996, White, 1994, White and Taket, 1996. 
48 Mosekilde and Laugesen, 2007. 
49 Bhaskar, 1993. 
50 Bhaskar, 1994, Bhaskar, 1993. 
51 Bhaskar, 1978. 
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relatively enduring, exercising or not exercising their causal powers in interaction with each 
other. 
 
The distinction is recognised between closed and open systems (and he does use the term 
‘system’ here) where the former allow constant conjunctions of events, the Humean version 
of causality, but the latter do not. The claim is also made that both nature, and our knowledge 
of it, are stratified and differentiated. That is, that having investigated a structure at one level, 
e.g., chemical reactions, we can investigate the mechanisms underlying and causing this 
behaviour at a deeper level, e.g., chemical valency, and so on.  
 
Emergent properties, which usually go along with ontological stratification, are not 
mentioned here, but are defended later in the book (p. 113). At this point Bhaskar is arguing 
against reductionism in science. He draws the distinction between the physical laws that may 
underlie the possible behaviours of, say, a machine, and the actual causal factors that lead to 
it being used in a particular way on a particular occasion. The latter cannot be explained 
purely in terms of the former, but come from higher level human or economic systems. He 
says: 
 
‘It follows from this that the operations of the higher level cannot be accounted for solely by 
the laws governing the lower-order level in which we might say the higher-order level is 
‘rooted’ and from which we might say it was ‘emergent’. … In short, emergence is an 
irreducible feature of our world’52  
 
He further defends emergence, particularly in the case of society being reduced to the actions 
of individuals, or mind being produced to neurophysiology, in The Possibility of Naturalism53 
where he characterises his position as ‘synchronic, emergent powers materialism. This will be 
taken up again in the discussion of holistic causation in Section 3. Elder-Vass offers an 
extended discussion of emergence in terns of CR’s account of causation54 and Archer’s 
account of social structure.55 
 
The other distinction introduced in the Introduction is between the intransitive and transitive 
domains of science. The former is the domain of objects of knowledge, such as structures and 
mechanisms, which are independent of humans while the latter is the domain of the human 
production of scientific knowledge. 
 
These concepts can be translated, prima facie, almost directly into the language of systems 
thinking (see Table 1): systems forming wholes; a hierarchy of systems with emergent 
properties; structure and process; and systemic structure and interaction generating observed 
behaviour. However, when we look more closely we can identify a range of potential 
differences and distinctions that are worth discussion. 
 
The first point is that Bhaskar is actually quite vague about terms such as structure, 
mechanism, thing, powers and tendencies. He does not really define them or explain what 
they might consist of, nor does he make it clear if they are actually synonyms or if there are 
differences between them. Bhaskar recognises this in the Postscript to The Possibility of 
                                                 
52 Bhaskar, 1978, p. 113. 
53 Bhaskar, 1979, p. 97. 
54 Elder-Vass, 2005. 
55 Elder-Vass, 2007a. 
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Naturalism (PON)56 where he responds to some critics. He says that he sees them as a 
network or family of terms (shades of Wittgenstein) that are interdependent but does not wish 
to define them more precisely so as to allow readers different ways in to the material.  
 
 
RTS and PON DPF and P Systems thinking 
structures, mechanisms, ‘things’ totality systems 
 parts/wholes parts/wholes 
powers, liabilities, tendencies holistic causality emergent properties 
 internal relations relationships 
open and closed systems open systems open and closed systems 
stratified ontology recursive embeddings hierarchy or nesting of systems 
emergent properties emergent properties emergent properties 
intransitive and transitive 
domains 
 the observed and the observer 
mechanisms generate events  structure generates behaviour or 
process 
 tensed, rhythmic spatial 
processes 
process, dynamics 
 absence, negativity, real non-
being 
 
 autopoiesis autopoiesis 
 transformative agency soft systems, 2nd order 
cybernetics 
  positive and negative feedback 
relations 
  boundaries 
Table 1 Comparison of Systems Concepts with Bhaskar’s Main Works 
 
He does, however, accept that he uses the term ‘structure’ to mean different things and tries 
to distinguish between structure and generative mechanism. ‘It now seems to me to be better 
to use the term ‘generative mechanism’ to refer only to the causal powers of ways of acting 
of structured things.’57 This seems to suggest that things have structures and, in virtue of that, 
possess causal powers which would be quite usual from a systems perspective. However the 
examples he gives do not accord with this. He suggests that a mechanism (his example being 
the market) may sustain several different structures, and that the same structure (his examples 
being nation-states or the family) may be reproduced by several mechanisms. First, it is not 
clear to me the difference between the market and a nation-state such that one is classified as 
a mechanism and the other as a structure. It also suggests a difference in level – mechanisms 
underlie and generate structures. But this becomes difficult when we consider that there are in 
fact many levels – does a structure at one level then become a mechanism for the structures 
of the next level up? 
 
I would like to suggest that much of this confusion could be avoided if the systems 
terminology were adopted. ‘System’ would then be the general term for entities, of any type – 
e.g., physical, social, cognitive etc., that populate the intransitive domain. Systems consist of 
components and their relations which together are characterised as their structure. By virtue 
of that structure, systems have emergent properties or causal powers or tendencies to behave 
in certain ways. Systems are stratified, that is they form nested hierarchies. There are causal 
relations between systems at a particular level that generate events in the world; and there are 
causal relations between levels in that properties or causal powers of systems at one level, 
                                                 
56 Bhaskar, 1979. 
57 Bhaskar, 1979, p. 170. 
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combined through their enduring relations, generate the emergent properties of the systems at 
the next level up.  
 
One could still use the term generative mechanism, which does have valuable connotations, 
within the context of CR’s retroductive methodology. Beginning with some particular events 
or observations that require explanation, we propose a particular (possibly unique) 
combination of systems, interacting together in certain ways, that would, if it existed, 
generate the observed events. We could give this ensemble the term generative mechanism. 
This is quite similar to Senge’s archetypes,58 mentioned above, which are particular sets of 
feedback relations that give rise to certain, common patterns of behaviour. An example is 
known as ‘success to the successful’: where two systems, e.g., universities, compete for a 
limited resource, e.g., good students. If university A gains a better reputation, for whatever 
reason, that starts an upward reinforcing feedback loop for A leading to more and more 
success, and a downward loop for B leading to less and less success even though both may 
have been similar to start with. These sort of processes can help explain the relatively wide 
dispersion of the ‘new universities’ (in the UK) that all started from scratch in the 1960s. 
3.2 Positive and negative feedback 
 
Discussion of feedback, or circular causal relations, leads me to point out that this concept is 
almost entirely missing from Bhaskar’s work. It is not mentioned in any indexes, nor is it an 
entry in the voluminous Dictionary of Critical Realism.59 There is a brief mention of 
homeostasis.60 Yet, I would argue, it is fundamental in understanding the dynamic behaviour 
of real-world systems. This omission is partly explicable in that the early books, which we 
are currently considering, were more concerned with establishing the ontological and 
structural reality of mechanisms, or systems, rather than analysing their actual behaviour, 
There is more consideration given to processes in the later, dialectical, works which we will 
discuss below. 
3.3 Processes and events 
 
The next issue to discuss is the concept of event, which is central to Bhaskar’s model. One of 
the primary distinctions is that between the enduring causal mechanisms and the temporal 
events that they generate, leading to the distinction between the domain of the Real and the 
domain of the Actual. Yet, the whole notion of an event is barely discussed at all even though 
it is the subject of significant debate within philosophy – see for example the Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry.61 For our purpose, I would suggest that an ‘event’ has 
two essential characteristics – that it is located at a particular point or interval in time and 
space rather than being an ongoing process or relationship, and that it involves some kind of 
change to a situation for if nothing changes there is no event.  
 
Considering first the time element, the implication is that there must be a start, finish and 
some duration but the point is that these are entirely relative to the systems under 
consideration. Although we tend to think of events in relations to our human time frames, 
e.g., births, deaths and marriages, in principle they are not absolute but entirely relative. 
Cosmic events, such as the death of a star, may take millions of years while quantum events 
                                                 
58 Senge, 1990. 
59 Hartwig, 2007. 
60 Bhaskar, 1986, 146. 
61 Casati and Varzi, 2002. 
 13 
 
occur in nanoseconds. Even on a human scale, events may take a few seconds, a few months 
or even a few years. The point I want to make is that events are not given to us as things in 
themselves; rather they must be carved out of the ongoing flux of activities and occurrences 
according to some criteria or interest. And what turns up as events, as opposed to enduring 
tendencies, depends very much on the time scale that is adopted. If we observe the economy, 
the credit crunch may be seen as a single event if we take a 10-year perspective, but it may be 
seen as an enduring tendency generating events of its own in a weekly-perspective. 
 
We must secondly consider the content of the event. We have said this must be a change, or 
else there would be no event, but a change in or of what? Surely there is nothing that can 
change other than the entities and structures (i.e., systems) that constitute the Real in the first 
place. There cannot be events as somehow ontologically distinct kinds of things. Thus events 
are nothing other than the changes that occur to and within entities and structures. These may 
be changes to an entity – i.e., it could gain or lose powers, or even disintegrate – or they may 
be interactions between entities that lead to certain outcomes or outputs. What is crucial, 
again, is the timeframe over which observations occur. The shorter the time frame, the more 
aspects of the situation that will be fixed or unchanging (structure in systems terms, enduring 
mechanisms in Bhaskar’s); the longer the time frame the more that will become variable and 
changing (process in systems terms, events in Bhaskar’s).  
 
Bhaskar does get close to this conceptualisation in a brief section within Scientific Realism 
and Human Emancipation 62 where he says ‘…the study of process where structure meets 
events; that is in the study of the mode of becoming, bestaying and begoing of a structure or 
thing. … Process is not an ontological category apart from structure and event’. From a 
systems perspective, perhaps, ontologically there are only systems – process is the change to 
a system which can be sliced up into a series of events. 
 
From a systems viewpoint this all points to the role of the observer. When conducting some 
sort of analysis or research, decisions have to be made about the level of the analysis (e.g., 
organisation, department or individual worker), the boundaries of the analysis (narrow or 
broad), and the timeframe. The particular decisions made, by the observer (i.e., the analyst or 
researcher) will determine what shows up as events to be explained rather than as explanatory 
generative mechanisms. Whilst Bhaskar recognises the general role of human activity in the 
production of knowledge through the transitive dimension of science, I would suggest that 
CR does not pay sufficient attention to the role of the actual scientist or researcher in a 
specific piece of research. It is the researcher(s) who, based on their own particular interests 
and pre-dispositions, carve out the object of scientific enquiry both by defining time frames, 




The concept of ‘boundary’ is itself a central one within systems thinking that is not dealt with 
by Bhaskar. Arguably, the concept of a ‘system’ existing within an ‘environment’ is the 
foundation for systems theory and yet what is it that separates a system from its environment 
– the system boundary. In fact, defining a system in terms of its components and their 
relations is effectively to delineate its boundary. Or, put the other way, in order to define a 
system it is necessary to define its boundary. Thus the drawing of a boundary is in fact the 
                                                 
62 Bhaskar, 1986, p. 215. 
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most primitive systemic act that one can perform. However, as soon as we move away from 
very simple physical objects whose boundary is uncontentious (and that is often the metaphor 
that Bhaskar has in mind) the decision as to what constitutes the boundary, and thereby what 
is defined as the system, becomes complex and observer-dependent.  
 
Even with essentially physical systems, there can be many different ways of conceptualising 
a system – consider for example a central heating system, or the human body. In these 
examples we can see that systemic thinking involves more than the simple recognition of 
particular objects. It begins with a particular phenomenon to be explained or purpose to be 
achieved. It then requires a degree of conceptualisation, rather than mere perception, to 
characterise an appropriate system in terms of components, relations and boundary. The 
boundary may in part have a material embodiment but generally it will simply represent a 
distinction or demarcation between that which has been selected as part of the system and 
that which is not. This does not mean that the boundary is purely arbitrary, or is wholly a 
construction of the observer. It rests on the components and relations that exist independently 
in the intransitive domain even though it is selected by the observer. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that the observer may get it wrong. Knowledge is always fallible and the real world 
will soon let us know if our choices of components, relations and boundaries do not in fact 
yield the appropriate behaviour. To quote a well-known management cybernetician, Stafford 
Beer,  
 
A system is not something given in nature, but something defined by intelligence. … 
We select, from an infinite number of relations between things, a set which, because 
of coherence and pattern and purpose, permits an interpretation of what otherwise 
might be a meaningless cavalcade of arbitrary events. It follows that the detection of 
system in the world outside ourselves is a subjective matter. Two people will not 
necessarily agree on the existence, or nature, or boundaries of any systems so 
detected.   63 
 
A detailed discussion of the difficulties of defining boundaries in different domains can be 
found in Mingers64 The point for CR is that this is a very real issue in actual research 
projects. 
4. Systemic Concepts in Dialectical Critical Realism 
With the move to dialectical critical realism (DCR) there is a tremendous proliferation of 
terms and arguments. The main structure of DCR is known as MELD and has four aspects 
known as first moment, second edge, third level and fourth dimension as shown in Table 2.  
 
1M, the first moment, is characterised in terms of non-identity, that is that things are not all 
the same, but involve many degrees of differentiation and stratification. 1M includes most of 
the distinctions from the early philosophy – transitive and intransitive, 
Real/Actual/Empirical; emergent powers, stratification, generative causality and mechanisms 
and events.  
 
2E, the second edge, is characterised in terms of negativity and absence, that is that the world 
consists as much of things that are not present as things that are; or rather that things that are 
present, or do occur, only do so against a background of things that are not. This aspect 
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brings in change and development for it is the need to fill an absence, or equivalently to 
absent an unwanted constraint, that brings about occurrences and events.  
 
3L, the third level, brings in many more systemic constructs. It is, in fact, characterised as 
totality, that is holism and holistic causality. It brings in parts/wholes, inter-relations and 
inter-activity, recursive embeddings and reflexivity.  
 
4D, the fourth dimension, is concerned with human agency, that is, emphasising that people 
are causative agents that can bring about change in a purposeful way. 
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Table 2 Overview of the MELD Categories 
 
4.1 Holistic causality 
 
Let us first consider holistic causality. Bhaskar makes clear what he means by this: it occurs 
when a complex ‘coheres’ (in our terms a system behaves) in such a way that, 
i) the totality causally determines the elements and,  
ii) the form and structure of the elements determines or co-determines the totality. 
If the word ‘determines’ sounds overly deterministic, he accepts that the term should include 
other, weaker, relations such as conditioning, limiting, selecting, sustaining or enabling.65 In 
considering this formulation, part ii) is quite unexceptional. It is the basic systemic notion of 
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emergent properties in which the behaviour and characteristics of the whole are generated by 
the structure of the parts and their relationships. However, part i) is much more controversial, 
even within systems thinking itself. For this suggests the in some way the whole, as a whole, 
influences or affects its parts, what is often called ‘downward causation’.  
 
There are several potential problems here. The first is what we might call a logical concern 
over levels of organisations, or relations between parts and wholes (mereology). We have 
seen that systems form nested hierarchies in which the parts and their relations at one level 
give rise to the properties or behaviours of the whole at the next level up. This local-to-global 
causation is generally accepted except amongst strong reductionists. However, in what sense 
can a whole be said to interact with its own parts? Surely it only interacts with other systems 
at it own level? Cars interact with roads and other cars, not with their own engines.  
 
The second problem is the philosophical one of microphysical reduction, i.e., that ultimately 
physics is seen as a closed and complete system of physical events.66 With upward causation 
it is possible to argue that if the lower level generates the higher level, states at the lower 
level correspond to states at the higher level (supervenience) and could at least in principle be 
explained in terms of them.67 However, downward causation would violate this principle and 
mean that there were genuinely necessary causal elements at levels beyond the physical. 
 
A third potential problem is that holistic causality can easily be interpreted as a version of 
functionalism. Indeed, classical functionalism, if it existed, can be seen as a clear case of 
holistic causality – the parts of a system such as a social system actually come into being 
come into being because the functions they perform are necessary for the maintenance of the 
whole. This is discussed by Bhaskar.68  
 
These concerns need to be dealt with and one way is through systems theory, in particular 
complexity theory (or non-linear dynamical systems), which has evolved a language 
extremely close to Bhaskar. Much of the debate about downward causation is at the level of 
the mind and its relations to the brain. Thompson and Varela,69 for example, characterise 
emergence as follows: 
 
A network, N, of interrelated components exhibits an emergent process, E, with emergent 
properties, P, if and only if: 
1. E is a global process that instantiates P and arises from the nonlinear dynamics, D, 
of the local interactions of N’s components. 
2. E and P have a global-to-local (‘downward’) determinative influence on the 
dynamics D of the components of N 
3. E and P are not exhaustively determined by the intrinsic properties of the 
components of N, that is they exhibit ‘relational holism’. 70 
 
The form of causation envisaged is one in which states of the whole system (called ‘global 
order parameters’) affect the possible states or behaviours of the components by constraining 
or affording particular paths or patterns of activity. So there is a ‘reciprocal causality’ in play 
in which the components interact directly and locally, generating and sustaining the 
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behaviour of the whole, while the whole sets the control parameters and boundary conditions 
for the components. Thompson and Varela71  give general examples such as autopoiesis72 and 
the immune system73  as well as specific neurophysiological examples, such as epilepsy, 
where it is possible to show conscious thought affecting nervous activity. Equally, we can use 
the example of social systems within critical realism. Here, social structure (or system) is 
only instantiated through the activities of social agents, but at the same time the social 
structure of roles and practices conditions the activities that agents can undertake.74  
 
This approach has the potential to deal with all three of the problems discussed above. If it 
can be demonstrated empirically, in some domain such as the mind or the social world, that 
downward causation does in fact occur then that refutes the first two objections. The issue of 
functionalist explanation is too complex to deal with here (see the entry in Dictionary of 
Critical Realism) but certainly Maturana and Varela have always maintained that their theory 
of autopoiesis is non-functionalist in that circular or reciprocal causality either happens, as a 
matter of fact, or it does not in which case the system disintegrates. They also accept the 
possibility of conflictual processes within a system. 
4.2 Absence and negativity 
 
One of the major developments from the early work to DCR was the incorporation of absence 
and negativity as one of the major presuppositions. Against the prevailing worldview that 
deals only with what positively occurs or exists, Bhaskar maintains that it is the absent or the 
negative which has priority for it is only against this that the positive stands out or happens. 
Bhaskar highlights four categories of absence: i) simple or ontological absence, i.e., that 
some thing or event that is expected does not occur or does not exist. Such absences can have 
causal effect and therefore ‘exist’ in the same way as other things. He calls them ‘de-onts’. 
The instrument that is not to hand, the bill that is unpaid, or the appointment that is missed all 
have causal effects. ii) Absence as a verb, i.e, absenting something or negating something, 
e.g., draining water or removing dirt; or absenting an absence, e.g., removing a need or want 
by fulfilling it. iii) Developing from these are ‘process-in-product’ whereby a process (e.g., 
shopping) leads to an absence (e.g., money in the bank), and iv) product-in-process whereby 
an entity or structure (e.g., poverty, lack of money) exercises its powers in producing an 
absence (necessities of life). 
 
This is interesting from a systems thinking point of view because it is not something that is 
generally discussed or considered in the modern literature and yet is clearly of great 
importance. In fact, its significance was recognised by some: it can be seen as the basis of 
cybernetic explanation as Bateson, one of the founders of cybernetics, observed:  
 
Causal explanation is usually positive. .. In contrast to this, cybernetic explanation is 
always negative. We consider what alternative possibilities could conceivably have 
occurred and then ask why were many of the alternatives not followed, so that the 
particular event was one of those few which could, in fact, occur. 75 
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A similar idea is at the heart of Luhmann’s76 theory of social communication in which a 
message acts as a trigger or selector from among the many responses or replies that could be 
generated – it selects that which is presenced from among all the other absent possibilities. 
We can also see the importance of absence in the idea of control by feedback. The feedback 
system (e.g., a thermostat) is always trying to close a gap (absent an absence) between the 
desired state of the system and the actual state of the system.77  
 
So, here could be a valuable contribution from CR to systems in terms of bringing to the 
forefront that which is generally absent, namely the concept of absence itself. 
4.3 Autopoiesis 
 
Autopoiesis means, literally systems that are self-producing or self-constructing. In 
traditional systems theory, systems were seen as open, transforming inputs into outputs. 
Biologists Maturana and Varela78 developed the concept of autopoiesis to explain the special 
nature of living as opposed to non-living systems. Autopoietic systems are closed and self-
referential – they do not primarily transform inputs into outputs, instead they transform 
themselves into themselves. The components of an autopoietic system enter into processes of 
production or construction to produce more of the same as necessary for the continuation of 
the system. The output of the system, that which it produces, is its own internal components, 
and the inputs it uses are again its own components. They are said to be organizationally 
closed but interactively open.79 The paradigm example is a single-celled organism such as 
amoeba. 
 
There have been several attempts to apply autopoiesis at levels above biology, in particular to 
suggest that social systems may be characterised as autopoietic,80 but this is controversial and 
remains an open question.81 Elder-Vass82 has specifically contrasted Luhmann’s approach 
with Bhaskar’s and Archer’s emergentism. 
 
Bhaskar uses the term autopoiesis in several ways although never referring to the original 
literature. In Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation he characterises the whole process 
of knowledge production in the transitive domain as ‘quasi-autopoietic’:  
‘{Cognitive resources} comprise the transitive objects of knowledge; their transformation is 
the transitive process of knowledge production; and its product, knowledge, in turn supplies 
resources for further rounds of inquiry. This imparts to the cognitive process a quasi-
autopoietic character’ 83 
 
This is actually an interesting potential application of autopoiesis which has been little 
explored. 
 
In DCR Bhaskar generalises this idea to describe the (re)production of the social system as a 
whole through human activity: 
                                                 
76 Luhmann, 1990. 
77 Wilden, 1977. 
78 Maturana and Varela, 1980, Maturana and Varela, 1987. 
79 Mingers, 1995. 
80 Luhmann, 1982, Luhmann, 1986, Robb, 1989. 
81 Mingers, 1992b, Mingers, 2002. 
82 Elder-Vass, 2007b. 




The activity-dependence of social structures entails its auto-poietic (sic) character, 
viz. that it is itself a social product, that is to say, that in our substantive motivated 
productions, we not only produce, but we also reproduce or transform the very 
conditions of our productions. 84 
 
Again, this is a very appealing metaphor, but can we go beyond metaphor and claim that 
social systems are, ontologically, autopoietic?85 
 
Finally, Bhaskar characterises emergence itself as being autopoietic: ‘In emergence, 
generally, new beings (entities, structures, totalities, concepts) are generated out of pre-
existing material from which they could have been neither induced nor deduced. … This is 
matter as creative, autopoietic.’ Bhaskar, 1993, p. 49.. 
 
This is certainly a stimulating idea for debate within both CR and systems. 
5. Conclusions 
Bhaskar, in one of his discussions about absence, uses the example of books in a library and 
the many forms of absence that give them meaning. This paper, too, has been about absence – 
in this case the huge absence in Bhaskar’s work of any reference to the domain or literature 
of systems thinking despite it informing so many of his ideas. This is not said simply as a 
criticism of Bhaskar but rather as a recognition and invitation for further development.  
 
The paper has hopefully served three purposes: i) to point out and justify the claim that many 
of the fundamental ideas of CR have already been developed within the disciplines of 
systems thinking and cybernetics and thereby open up this literature for followers of CR. ii) 
To try and demonstrate that potentially systems thinking has much to offer CR in terms of 
providing clearer articulations of the concepts, and also other concepts, such as circular 
causality through positive and negative feedback loops, that could be useful for CR. And, iii) 
to suggest that CR can also be beneficial for systems thinking partly by providing a more 
rigorous philosophical underpinning that systems lacks, and by its development of particular 
concepts such as absence/negativity.  
 
At the least, I hope that this paper may open up dialogue and debate between the two 
disciplines. 
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